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The Legality and Legitimacy of Unilateral
Armed Intervention in an Age of Terror,
Neo-Imperialism, and Massive Violations
of Human Rights: Is International Law
Evolving in the Right Direction?
J.-G. CASTEL
INTRODUCTION
Ahen the United Nations was created in 1945, its main pur-
pose was to deal with threats to international peace and secu-
rity in order to prevent states from waging aggressive wars. Today,
especially since 9/11, terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, and internal conflicts involving massive violations of
human rights are some of the new challenges confronting this or-
ganization. The Security Council, which is charged with the main-
tenance of international peace and security, has not been very
consistent and quick in addressing these issues. As a result, when it
has failed to authorize collective action, some states have resorted
to unilateral military action to respond to real state and human
security needs. Such action has prompted the international com-
munity to reconsider the international law rules applicable to these
new challenges. This article considers whether a state or a coalition
of states without UN authorization may or must take militaryac-
tion against another state sponsoring terrorism or depriving its na-
tionals of their internationally recognized human rights.
WEAKNESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN CONFRONTED
WITH AN IMPERIAL POWER
International law is a body of rules, processes, and institutions
derived from international agreements and customary practice
developed over the centuries governing international society. By
J.-G. Castel, O.C., Q.C., 0.0., F.R.S.C., L.S.M., S.J.D., L.L.D., Chevalier de la Legion
d'honneur, Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School.
This article is a revised version of a public lecture given at York University on
7 February 2005. The author is grateful to Matthew Castel for his excellent re-
search assistance.
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restraining the conduct of states and adjusting their respective jur-
isdictions, it insures systemic international stability and the coexist-
ence of equal independent sovereign states with different values,
concepts, and beliefs. International law also promotes cooperation
in various domains of human activities in order to achieve certain
fundamental common goals - for instance, the protection of hu-
man rights - and providing a moral dimension. Today, interna-
tional law is evolving in such a way that solidarity and cooperation
have become more important than coexistence.
However, although world solidarity and cooperation have in-
creased considerably, especially since the end of the Cold War, and
most states consider that they belong to a true international com-
munity, sharing a common destiny that creates obligations that can-
not be ignored, state sovereignty is still alive and well. As a result,
states, especially powerful ones, do not bear well outside constraints
and often resort to unilateral action that may not be in conformity
with the dictates of international law. This is particularly true with
respect to the type of neo-imperialism practised by the United States.
After the Cold War ended, the international community hoped
that a new world order would emerge that would emphasize greater
political, social, and economic cooperation based on international
law and international institutions. Unfortunately, the threat of ter-
rorism has forced some states and especially the United States1 to
pursue their national security interests with vigour. To counter this
threat, the United States has embarked upon a full-scale transfor-
mation of the international order, by force if necessary, sometimes
in disregard of the long-term interests and expectations of the in-
ternational community.
Throughout the history of the United States, Americans have at
times been isolationists and at times interventionists. Today, inter-
ventionist tendencies prevail, as there is no security in isolation-
ism. It is evident that the United States has an exceptional role to
play in human rights crises by virtue of its founding principles, its
moral ideals, and its status as sole remaining superpower. However,
it must be able transcend its national interest in favour of these
universal moral ideals, just as power must be combined with prin-
ciple. This is not easily achieved as realism is the central tenet of
the national interest and there always exists a state of tension be-
tween this interest and moral obligations.
I S. Talbott and N. Chandra, eds., The Age of Terror (2001).
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Whereas during the Cold War, US policy was defensive, now it is
largely offensive in order to maintain American political, economic,
and cultural hegemony on a global scale. As President Bill Clinton's
secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, stated,2 the United States is
the indispensable nation endowed with unique responsibilities and
obligations. The United States wants to shape a new global order
in its own image that will preserve and expend its imperium. This
new form of imperialism does not seek territorial gains but to cre-
ate an open and integrated international order based on the prin-
ciples of democratic capitalism guaranteed and enforced by the
United States.' Current American reliance on military power to set
things right has reached a new height as the US defensive perim-
eter now encompasses the whole world. The war on terrorism, which
began on 9/1 1, is really a war to preserve and advance the strategy
of openness, free trade, and globalization, thereby ensuring US
hegemony.
President George W. Bush has not changed the goals set by his
predecessors. After his re-election, he declared that in the future
he is still prepared to act unilaterally and to use military power if
necessary, as in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to ensure American
security and continued prosperity. On i December 2004, in a key-
note speech delivered in Halifax, he declared: "There is only one
way to deal with enemies who plot in secret and set out to murder
the innocent and the unsuspecting. We must take the fight to them.
We must be relentless and we must be steadfast in our duty to pro-
tect our people."4 These goals comprise the promotion of peace,
freedom, and democracy as well as the protection of human rights
around the world on the ground that liberal democracies do not
wage war against one another. The United States will achieve them
by persuasion or by force even if it involves the removal of dictators
and non-democratic regimes that stand in the way. It will also main-
tain the right to resort to anticipatory or preventive self-defence if
it finds itself threatened in any way, especially by terrorism.
Many states and individuals are opposed to this approach on the
ground that it is contrary to international law in so far as interven-
tion constitutes an unjustified interference in the internal and ex-
ternal affairs of states that is prohibited by the Charter of the United
2 "If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable
nation," quoted by AJ. Bacevich, American Empire (2003) at x.
3 Ibid. at 3.
4 Globe and Mail, 2 December 2004, at Ai i.
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Nations (UN Charter).' Only with the approval of the Security Coun-
cil, pursuant to Chapter VII of this UN Charter, could intervention
be justified or when it takes place within the strict confines of self-
defence. Thus, unilateral armed intervention motivated by the non-
democratic form of government of the target state is not an
exception to the principle of non-intervention.
The dilemma faced by the United States is to reconcile a concern
for moral principles and international law with the imperatives of
national and international power to pursue the national interest.
What is good for General Motors may not be good for the whole
world! International law is foremost an instrument of international
politics, which it serves in order to create a modicum of stability
and predictability in international relations either directly or
through international organizations. Thus, when a state believes
that a rule of international law is contrary to its national or interna-
tional interests, its natural tendency is not to reject it but to re-
interpret it in a way that supports such interests or to deny its
application to the situation at hand. In the absence of a superior
authority whose decision is binding, and although all states are
deemed to be equal, the temptation to do so is much greater when
the state is a powerful one and the other members of the interna-
tional community are weak or dependants. This is particularly true
today in light of American neo-imperialism. 6 As George Orwell7
wrote in the book Animal Farm: A Fairy Story, all animals are equal
but some are more equal than others! This attitude on the part of
powerful states is a persistent factor that weakens international law.
A democracy without values turns into open or thinly disguised
totalitarianism.
Another weakness of the present system is that there can be no
objective determination of the conduct of a state. As the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice stated in the the Steamship Lotus
case,8 "[i] nternational law governs relations between independent
states. The rules of law binding upon states therefore emanate from
5 Charter of the United Nations, 26June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 (amended in
1965, 1968, and 1973) [UN Charter].
6 Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (2003);
T. Roszac, La menace am&icaine (2004). On American national interest, see
Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2ooo: Promoting the National Interest" (Jan./
Feb. 2000) 79 Foreign Affairs 47.
7 George Orwell, Animal Farm: A Fairy Story (1945) at 90 and Ch. X.
8 The Steamship Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J. Series A, No. so, p. 18.
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their own free will." Being the creators of the norms, it is for them to
interpret these norms according to their national and international
interests. They decide for themselves if their actions are in confor-
mity with international law. This determination is essentially sub-
jective since they are judge and party.9
A further difficulty arises from the emergence of new categories
of superior norms of international law such as jus cogens, which
comprises rules that are peremptory, permitting no derogation,
and the breach of which constitutes an international crime, 10 for
instance, the principle of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of
force11 and genocide 12 and obligations omnium erga omnes incurred
by all states towards the international community in general, for
instance, in the field of human rights.1 3 How and by whom are
their existence and scope to be determined?
The consequences of the violations of international law norms
and rules are also uncertain as each state is free to decide what
should be done if its rights have been infringed. In doing so, politi-
cal considerations are paramount, which explains why some states
escape sanctions for violating international law. With the emergence
of a single superpower, resort to armed unilateral action without
the approval of the United Nations when the national or interna-
tional interests of that power are at stake raises the question of its
legality and legitimacy under international law. The legality and
legitimacy of the 2003 unilateral armed intervention in Iraq by the
the United States and its allies, without the approval of the United
9 The International Court ofJustice (ICJ) deals with legal disputes only with the
consent of the parties or in an advisory manner at the request of the United
Nations. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, available at <http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm> at Articles
36, 38, and 65.
10 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 1969
(in force 198o) at Article 53.
11 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Article 2 (4). Note that other principles found in the
Charter cannot be contradicted by customary international law rules unless such
rules are jus cogens.
12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (1951) [Convention on Genocide].
13 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Second Phase) (Belgium v. Spain), [1970]
I.C.J. Rep. 3, paras. 33-34. Self determination is a right erga omnes, Advisory
opinion on The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/> at para. 88, citing East Timor
(Portugal v. Australia), [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 9o , para. 29 and advisory opinion on
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226, para. 79.
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Nations, illustrates the dilemma that the international community
faces today since the reasons given for such intervention were both
self-defence and the violation of human rights. Does such armed
intervention constitute a desirable evolution of international law
or has international law been eroded by it?
NON-INTERVENTION: THE BASIC RULES AND PRINCIPLES
Intervention consists of any act by one state or a group of states
that attempts to interfere or interferes by force or by other means
in the internal or external affairs of another state. The basic rules
and principles of international law governing intervention are en-
shrined primarily in the UN Charter, which codifies the principle
of non-intervention based on the sovereign equality of states.14 Ar-
ticle 2 (4) of the Charter declares that "[a] 11 members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Paragraph (7) of the same article states that "[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII." This principle, which applies to the
United Nations as an organization, extends afortiori to all member
states in their relations with other states. The exception to the pro-
hibition enables the Security Council to take military action against
a state to maintain or restore international peace and security pro-
vided the Security Council has first determined that there exists a
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
15
In principle, the Security Council can only intervene in matters
related to international peace and security.
Unilateral armed intervention, which is prohibited by Article 2 (4)
and (7) of the UN Charter, except in very limited circumstances
(for instance, by the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence
14 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Chapter 1 "Purposes and Principles" and Chapter
VII "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression." See also G.M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno, eds., Beyond
Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (1995).
15 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Article 39. Article VIII of the Convention on Geno-
cide, supra note 12, may be an exception to this requirement.
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pursuant to Article 51 )16 and by customary international law, pre-
supposes effective institutions and the proper implementation of
Chapter VII. When the system of collective security fails, states may
be inclined to resort to unilateral armed intervention on their own
initiative. Other international documents such as the 1965 UN Dec-
laration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Af-
fairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty,17 the 1970 UN Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Dec-
laration on Friendly Relations)," and the 1975 Final Act of the
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 19 re-
iterate the same principles.20
INTERVENTION IN IRAQ
DESERT STORM 1990-91: STATE VERSUS STATE-ARMED AGGRESSION
When, on I August 199 o , Saddam Hussein's army entered Ku-
wait, Iraq clearly violated Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. The next
day, the Security Council condemned Iraq's invasion and demanded
the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its forces.21 Iraq did
not comply and, on 8 August, announced the annexation of Kuwait.
This action was immediately declared illegal, null, and void by the
Security Council. 22 On 29 November 199o, the Security Council
16 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
17 UN Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, Res. 2131,
UN Doc. A/RES/21 3 (XX)/Rev. t, reprinted in (1966) 6o Am.J. Int. L. 662.
18 UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, 1971, UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), UNGAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28 at 121, UN Doc. A/8o28/ [Declaration on Friendly Relations].
19 Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, i
August 1975, reprinted in (1975) 14 I.L.M. 1292.
20 The charters of a number of regional organizations contain similar rules. See,
for example, Charter of Organization of American States, 1948, as amended,
Can. T.S. No. 23, 199o, at Article 18.
21 Resolution 66o, UN Doc. S/RES/ 66o (2 August 199o).
22 Resolution 662, UN Doc. S/RES/ 662 (9 August 199o).
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authorized the use of force in order to reverse the invasion unless
Iraq evacuated Kuwait before 15 January 1991 .23 Since Iraq failed
to comply with this resolution by the appointed time, Operation
Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991. The UN military opera-
tion was led by the United States. Kuwait was liberated and victory
was declared on 27 February 1991. As a member of the United
Nations, the United States had to support the action taken against
Iraq. The intervention did not violate international law since the
United States was acting in compliance with the resolutions of the
Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
SECOND GULF WAR: 2002-3: THE IMPACT OF THE AGE OF TERROR
Pre-emptive, Anticipatory, or Preventive?
In the fall of 2002 and in the winter of 2003, the United States
argued before the Security Council that there was evidence that
Iraq had not complied with UN Security Council Resolutions 68724
and 1441,25 ordering it to destroy the weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) that it was supposed to possess, and that there was a dan-
ger that some of these weapons would be supplied to A1-Qaida and
other terrorist groups to be used against a number of states, espe-
cially the United States. Thus, military action was necessary to force
compliance. The Security Council did not believe the Americans
and was not prepared to authorize the use of force, which was pos-
sible pursuant to Resolution 1441, paragraph 13, which states "that
the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious con-
sequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations."
The Security Council relied on the opinion of Hans Blix, the UN
chief weapons inspector who reported that the inspection, which
had resumed after an interruption of four years ordered by Saddam
Hussein, was now proceeding smoothly, and although no WMD
had yet been found, more time was necessary before concluding
that Iraq was in breach of its obligations.
As a result of this lack of support by the Security Council, the
United States withdrew its proposed resolution authorizing the use
of force to secure compliance and, acting outside the United Na-
tions, organized the Coalition of the Willing, which included the
23 Resolution 678, UN Doc. S/RES/678 (29 November 199o).
24 Resolution 687, UN Doc. S/RES/687 (3 Aprii 1991).
25 Resolution 1441, UN Doc. S/RES/1 4 4 1 (8 November 2002).
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United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Australia, and others. The 2003 cam-
paign to depose Saddam Hussein was short and successful.
Legality
When a state sponsors terrorist acts or aids terrorist groups in any
way to further its or their goals against other states or their nationals,
this action constitutes a violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter
and the 197o Declaration on Friendly Relations. 26 It is also an act
of aggression according to the 1974 definition of aggression.
27
If attacked by a terrorist act perpetrated or sponsored by a state,
a victim state can respond in self-defence 28 until the Security Coun-
cil becomes seized of the matter, pursuant to Article 39 of the UN
Charter and authorizes collective enforcement action. 29 Collective
security is the basis upon which the Security Council has the right
to deal effectively with acts of international terrorism. Should a
state be threatened by a terrorist act, the customary international
law right of individual or collective self-defence also comes into
play.
In order to establish the legality of unilateral intervention with-
out UN approval and in the absence of an actual armed attack by
Iraq on the United States, the United States and its allies relied on
a variation of the customary international law right of pre-emptive
self-defence against a threat of imminent attack. The doctrine of
pre-emptive self-defence has its origin in the United Kingdom v. United
States case (Caroline case).3° It also finds support in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits),31 where the
26 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 18.
27 GA Resolution 3314, 14 December 1974, reprinted in (1974) 13 I.L.M. 71o at
Article 3 (g). "The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, irregulars,
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such
gravity as to amount to acts listed above or its substantial involvement therein."
28 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Article 51.
29 SC Resolution 748, UN Doc. S/RES/ 7 4 8 (31 March 1992), with respect to Libya.
30 United Kingdom v. United States ( 1837), 2 Moore 409 [ Caroline case].
31 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States ofAmerica) (Merits), [1986] I.CJ. Rep. 14, at paras. 187-93 [Military Activi-
ties in Nicaragua]. See also UN SC Resolution 1368, UN Doc.S/RES/1 3 68 (12
September 200 1), and SC Resolution 1373, UN Doc. S/RES/1 3 7 3 (28 Septem-
ber 2oo), which reaffirm the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence. Note that the latter resolution recognizes that acts of terrorism constitute
12 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 2004
International Court of Justice expressed the view that customary
international law on the use of force exists independently of Ar-
ticle 2 (4) of the UN Charter. Therefore, pre-emptive self-defence
exists outside Article 51 of the UN Charter, which only deals with
self-defence against an actual armed attack until the Security Council
takes action. The customary international law right of pre-emptive
self-defence is the inherent and natural right of a state to act for
self-preservation in the face of a serious and imminent or proximate
threat to its national security and territorial integrity (for instance,
troops of a hostile country are massed at the borders ready to at-
tack). As opposed to Article 51 of the UN Charter, no actual armed
attack need to have taken place before pre-emptive self-defence
can be used. However, fundamental to the exercise of the right of
pre-emptive self-defence, the intervention must be born out of ne-
cessity and the level of force must be proportional to the harm it
seeks to redress. In other words, the response must not be unrea-
sonable or excessive.
32
The variation added by the United States to the customary inter-
national law of pre-emptive self-defence is anticipatory or preventive
self-defence against states sponsoring terrorism. As one aspect of
the so-called Bush doctrine,33 it purports to allow a state, without
a threat to international peace and security without ascribing these acts to a
particular state. This is a new approach to the concept of self-defence. Does it
mean that where a state without sponsoring terrorism fails to take appropriate
measures on its territory to prevent the occurrence of terrorist acts in another
state, the latter state would be able to intervene to make up for this deficiency?
PerJustice Kooijmans in a separate opinion to the advisory opinion on The Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July
2004, I.CJ. No. 131, at paras. 35-36, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/>. The
court held that a state has no right to use force in self-defence against terrorist
attacks that are not imputable to a foreign state. See also SC Resolution 1566,
UN Doc. S/RES/1 5 5 6 (8 October 2004), at para. t: "acts of terrorism ... by
whomsoever committed."
32 Military Activities in Nicaragua, supra note 31 at para. 176; and advisory opinion
on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.CJ. Rep. 226,
paras. 37-50.
33 Speech by George W. Bush, White House, 17 September 2002, available at <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html> at i. The new policy was fully de-
lineated on that day in a National Security Council text entitled The National
Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, available at <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/print/nssall.html> at chs. III and V. See alsoJ. Record, "The Bush Doc-
trine and War with Iraq" (Spring 2003) Parameters: U.S. Army War College
Quarterly 4-2 1.
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prior approval of the Security Council, to act in anticipatory self-
defence, not just pre-emptively against an imminent or proximate
threat but preventively against a non-imminent or non-proximate
but still real threat. Its rationale rests on a definition of the threat
to a state based on a combination of "radicalism and technology,"
that is, political and religious extremism joined by the availability
of WMD. Thus, the second Iraqi war became part of the war on
terrorism. In light of the lack of action by the Security Council, the
United States, as the intended victim of terrorism, was free to de-
cide for itself that security problems justified armed intervention.
Having experienced 9/11, the United States and its allies argued
that Saddam Hussein was now an evil terrorist since, allegedly, there
was proof that he was prepared to supply Osama bin Laden and
other Al-Qaida terrorists with WMD to be used against America on
its territory. President Bush maintained that the nexus between ter-
rorist organizations of global reach, states sponsoring terrorism,
and WMD makes small or impoverished states and even small groups
of individuals dangerous adversaries. A good example is Al-Qaida,
a non-governmental terrorist organization, which is not subject to
international law since it is not a state. Therefore, the Cold War
concepts of deterrence and containment are irrelevant against such
organizations.
Since the attacks by terrorists in the United States and elsewhere
before the intervention by the Coalition of the Willing, as a result
of a message by A1-Qaida aired on Al Jazeera, were perceived as
potential and even imminent, they required an urgent response.
Thus, the United States and its allies had to resort to anticipatory
or preventive self-defence against Iraq and its chief villain Saddam
Hussein even though he had not attacked the United States and
was not planning to do so directly in the future. The concept of
imminent threat relevant to pre-emptive self-defense had to be
adapted to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.
The United States maintained that it must be able to reach poten-
tial threats to its security at their source before they could cause
harm to the homeland or to the country's interests in the world. To
defend itself, the United States and its allies had to eliminate Saddam
Hussein to prevent him from supplying terrorists with WMD to be
used presently or in the immediate future against the United States.
In this way, the United States could overcome the legal limitations
imposed by international law on pre-emptive self-defence since there
was a lack of convincing evidence of imminent direct attack by Iraq
against the United States.
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The Bush doctrine, which states that in the case of an imminent
or anticipated attack by a terrorist group such as Al-Qaida, acting
as the agent, surrogate, or proxy of Saddam Hussein, a state unilat-
erally can resort to pre-emptive or anticipatory-preventive self-de-
fence and intervene by force against the state that supplied the
weapons to the terrorist group, is not yet sanctioned by interna-
tional law.
Legitimacy
The use of military force by the Coalition of the Willing must be
not only legal but also legitimate. Precautionary principles of le-
gitimacy must be met before intervening. Although the threatened
harm to the intervening states may have justified primafacie the use
of military force, it is not clear that its primary purpose was to thwart
the threat of terrorism. Securing Iraqi oil resources may have been
more important. In addition, not all non-military options for meet-
ing the threat in question had been explored before resorting to
military action as a last resort since Iraq was willing to cooperate
with the UN inspectors on the destruction of WMD. In response to
this willingness, the Coalition of the Willing stated that based on
past experience such inspections would not be effective. Finally,
although the military action was proportional to the threat and was
successful in meeting it, the consequences of the intervention seem
to be worse today than the consequences of inaction.
Although Saddam Hussein's WMD ambitions were a potential
and probably an inevitable threat rather than an imminent one,
potential threats must be addressed by the international commu-
nity. When they materialize, as in North Korea or Iran today, the
crisis that is caused is much more dangerous than the crisis loom-
ing. The difficulty is how to deal with the latter. By allegedly waging
war by proxy against the United States, Iraq should not have been
able to avoid being the target of anticipatory-preventive self-defence.
In its 2 December 2004 report entitled A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change recognizes that "if there are good arguments for pre-
ventive military action with good evidence to support them, they
should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize action
if it chooses to ... [I]n a world full of perceived potential threats,
the risk to the global order and the norm of non intervention on
which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of
unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed
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action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all." 34 The
panel rejects unilateral action in favour of collective action autho-
rized by the Security Council in cases of perceived potential threats.
For this reason, it is against rewriting or reinterpreting Article 51
of the UN Charter. In light of the present state of international law,
one cannot escape the conclusion that the intervention by the Co-
alition of the Willing was illegal and illegitimate unless anticipatory-
preventive self-defence is considered to be a logical evolution of
the customary international law of pre-emptive self-defence.
UNILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTERVENTION
The United States and its allies also argued that military inter-
vention is legitimate and morally justified when a state treats its
people in such a substandard way that they are denied their funda-
mental human rights, including democratic rights, and the protec-
tion of these rights can only be assured from the outside. In the
case of Iraq, it was clear that Saddam Hussein was a dictator who
had a long record of massive human rights abuses and that any
move against him could be morallyjustified. Human rights consid-
erations outweighed the reasons against intervention.35 Armed in-
tervention to force a state to respect human rights has now become
the primary officialjustification by the Coalition of the Willing since,
so far, no WMD or links with Al-Qaida have been found. However,
it is a doctrine that is not yet well established under international
law except when non-military humanitarian assistance is requested
by a state as a result of physical calamities such as earthquakes,
floods, famine, and epidemics.
Legality and Legitimacy
When a state exercises its jurisdiction, it must be not only in the
interest of its people but also in the interest of the international
34 UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, UNGA Doc. A/ 5 9 / 5 6 5 , at paras. 190-92 [More Secure
World]. See also Kofi A. Annan, Speech to the UN General Assembly, 23 Septem-
ber 2003, available at <http://.unausa.org/aboutus/annano 9 2 3o 3.asp>.
35 The concern is with the violation of human rights, for instance, the violation of
rights found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966),
999 U.N.TS. 171, and not with the violations of international humanitarian law
in the case of armed conflict as in the 1949 Geneva Convention IV (civilians)
(1950), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, or in cases of humanitarian assistance in the case of
natural disasters or epidemics.
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community as a whole. A state has the responsibility to protect its
people. State sovereignty must yield to international obligations; it
is not absolute and unconditional. In this context, human rights
intervention is the threat to use force or its use by a state, a group
of states, or an international organization for the purpose of pro-
tecting the nationals of the targeted state from widespread depriva-
tion of internationally recognized human rights by that state and
without its consent.
Is the threat or use of force for the purpose of protecting and
enforcing human rights lawful under international law as an ex-
ception to Article 2 (4) and (7) of the UN Charter whether the
intervening states are acting with or without the express authoriza-
tion of the United Nations? Although a modern doctrine of hu-
man rights intervention is slowly emerging, 6 the right to intervene
forcibly and unilaterally for human rights reasons without obtain-
ing the consent of the targeted state or that of the Security Council
or collectively with the approval of the Security Council is still a
very controversial subject. The UN Charter does not expressly rec-
ognize the right to use force to protect the people of a state from
their own government or in the event of an overall breakdown in
governmental authority, even in the face of genocide.37
The first legal objection to such a type of intervention is based
on Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which, as already noted, prohib-
its any type of intervention except as provided for in Chapter VII of
the Charter. In other words, even when a state has abused its sover-
eign powers by violating the basic human rights of the people within
its borders, it should not be liable to any type of intervention by
another state or group of states. If we consider forcible collective
human rights intervention by the United Nations under Chapter
VII as an exception permitted by the UN Charter, the Security
36 See in general P. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the
Use of Force ( 993); K. Tomasevsky, Responding to Human Rights Violations 194 6-
1999 (2000); S. Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention
(1996); Don Hubert and Rob McRae, Human Security and the New Diplomacy
(2002); S.D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention (1996); M.S. Klimow, Moral Ver-
sus Practical: The Future of US Armed Intervention (1996); 0. Corten and P. Klein,
Droit d 'ingerance ou obligation de riaction? (1992); C. Scott, "Interpreting Interven-
tion" (2001) 39 Can. Y.B. Int. L. 333; P. Garigue, "Intervention-Sanction and
'droit d'ing~rence' in International Humanitarian Law" (1993) 48 Int. J. 668;
and M. Toufayan, "Deployment of Troops to Prevent Impending Genocide: A
Contemporary Assessment of the UN Security Council's Powers" (2002) 40 Can.
YB. Int. L. 195.
37 However, see Convention on Genocide, supra note 12 at Article VIII.
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Council must still determine authoritatively whether in the par-
ticular situation the human rights violations constitute a "threat to
the peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression."38 Recent
events in various parts of the world, for instance, in Iraq, Liberia,
Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Rwanda, East
Timor, and Darfur, have clearly indicated that the consideration of
human rights tragedies that could trigger Chapter VII is an impor-
tant element in the maintenance of peace and security. At the time
of drafting Chapter VII, human rights intervention was not envis-
aged. Its purpose was to deal with classic interstate conflicts and
international security. However, in some cases, human rights abuses
can become a threat to, or a breach of, the peace without a
transnational nexus justifying the measures under Chapter VII.
Unlike Article 33 of Chapter VI,39 Article 39 in its opening words
does not speak of "international" peace and security but simply of a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace," although its closing words
refer to "'measures to maintain or restore international peace." Thus,
Chapter VII could also be used to address internal violence and
unrest that threaten the peace within a state as well as genocide. 4
0
Article 2 (4) aims to protect the territorial sovereignty and political
independence of a state, which is not the case with respect to hu-
man rights intervention since the intervening state does not seek
to deprive the targeted state of its territorial or political attributes.
A second legal objection to human rights intervention is based
on Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in
the domestic affairs of a state. Although the early practice of the
United Nations was to interpret broadly the words "within the do-
mestic jurisdiction" so as to include human rights within such juris-
diction, thus preventing the Security Council from taking action
against a member of the UN for violating human rights recognized
by the UN Charter,41 this is no longer the case. The United Nations
has since admitted that, in some instances, individuals may become
subjects of international law and has adopted numerous interna-
tional covenants, charters, and declarations dealing with human
38 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Article 39.
39 Ibid. at Chapter VI, which deals with the pacific settlement of disputes.
40 Convention on Genocide, supra note 12 at Article VIII, which does not refer to
international peace and security.
41 UN Charter, supra note 5 at Articles 55.c (respect and observance of human
rights by members ) and 56 (cooperation of members with the United Nations
for the achievement of the purposes of Art. 55.c).
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rights. How can violations of human rights be considered a domes-
tic matter when such rights create obligations erga omnes and some
of them such as genocide are jus cogens?42 To overcome the prohi-
bition of Article 2(7), it is sufficient to show that human rights
crises do not fall "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state." They are the concern of the international community as a
whole. Of course, for each state, the scope of the reserved domain
of non-intervention is variable. It depends upon the international
human rights obligations it has accepted unless they are jus cogens.
Today, Article 2, paragraphs (4) and (7), can no longer be consid-
ered to be obstacles to UN intervention for the protection of hu-
man rights. National sovereignty cannot be invoked to immunize a
state or a dictator such as Saddam Hussein and others from inter-
national sanctions.
International law has evolved in the right direction by enabling
the Security Council to resort to enforcement measures under Chap-
ter VII. It took such action in 1991 to protect the Kurds and the
Shiite Moslems in Iraq, 43 although no direct collective armed inter-
vention took place. At that time, most members of the Security
Council were of the opinion that the Kurds' situation was a threat to
international peace and security." As then, Secretary GeneralJavier
Perez de Cuellar wrote in his annual report on the work of the
United Nations, which was presented to the General Assembly in
September 1991, Article 2(7) can no longer be regarded as a pro-
tective barrier behind which human rights can be massively or sys-
tematically violated with impunity: "What is involved is not the right
of intervention but the collective obligation of states to bring relief
and redress in human rights emergencies. It seems beyond ques-
tion that violations of human rights imperil peace."4 5 However, he
added that international action for protecting human rights must
be based on a decision taken in accordance with the UN Charter. It
must not be a unilateral act. Therefore, if one accepts this view, the
Coalition of the Willing was in breach of international law.
42 See notes 10-13 in this article.
43 SC Resolution 688, UN Doc. S/RES/688 (5 April 1991), (1991) 30 I.L.M. 858.
44 See also East Timor, SC Resolution 1264, UN Doc. S/RES/ 1264 (15 September
1999); Somalia, SC Resolution 794, UN Doc. S/INF/ 4 8 (3 December 1992)
(partial armed intervention).
45 Annual Report on the Work of the United Nations, Doc. A/ 4 6/ 1, GADR 4 6th Sess.,
Suppl. No. 1, ST/JPDI/ 1168. See also Kofi A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sover-
eignty," The Economist, 18 September 1999.
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Another question left unanswered is whether intervention to re-
store or establish democracy is part of human rights intervention?4 6
Trying to change the political situation directly is dangerous since
human rights intervention lacks the mandate to alter the funda-
mental causes of inhumane conditions. Yet, why should the root
causes of human rights intervention, for instance, Saddam Hussein,
be left in place? Is it wrong to support or establish a democratic
system of government in another state against an illegitimate re-
gime? At the present international law does not support this type
of intervention. 4
7
Although the principle of non-intervention should not be lightly
cast aside, it appears that Chapter VII provides a good legal justifi-
cation for forcible collective intervention by the Security Council
when there are serious questions concerning the violation of hu-
man rights and humanitarian law, the need for humanitarian assis-
tance, and perhaps a lack of democracy. The protection of human
rights abolishes the distinction between the domestic and interna-
tional jurisdiction of states. A state derives legitimacy in part from
its citizens. If it denies them their fundamental rights, the constraint
against external intervention no longer applies.
If the Security Council is incapable or unwilling to deal with the
issue of gross violations of human rights, for instance due to a veto,
the UN General Assembly could act pursuant to the Uniting for
Peace Resolution precedent.48 Regional and sub-regional organi-
zations could also take action pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter. These international bodies would add legitimacy to the
intervention as they would be less suspect of serving any particular
national agenda.
HUMAN RIGHTS INTERVENTION AS AN INDEPENDENT DOCTRINE OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Where action by the United Nations or a regional or sub-regional
organization has been solicited and rejected, may a state or a group
46 This was one of the reasons given for the US intervention in Panama in 1989.
See also Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (free elec-
tions), UN Doc. A/81o (1948). However, see Declaration on Friendly Relations
(freedom to choose political system ), supra note 18; and Military Activities in
Nicaragua. supra note 31 at paras. 2o6 and 209.
47 See, for example, Military Activities in Nicaragua, supra note 31 at paras. 202-9.
48 Uniting for Peace Resolution, 195 1, GA Res. 377 (V) UN GAOR, 5 th Sess., Supp.
No. 20, UN Doc. A/i 775 at lo. The resolution does not authorize intervention
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of states, such as the Coalition of the Willing, unilaterally intervene
in another state to protect human rights? In other words, is there a
customary international law right to intervene by force for human
rights reasons whether or not collective security fails to function?
Since Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter imposes a virtually all-embracing
ban on the use of force with the exception of self-defence in Article
5 1, it would seem that resort to human rights intervention without
UN approval pursuant to Chapter VII is not possible. However, as
already mentioned, the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) in the
Nicaragua case49 was of the opinion that there exists a customary
law on the use of force independent of Article 2(4). Thus, it is
arguable that there is also a customary international law right of
intervention in the case of massive and systemic violations of hu-
man rights by a state, which is independent of Article 2 (4) and (7)
of the UN Charter. The right coexists with Article 2(4) and (7),
just as the customary right of pre-emptive self-defence coexists with
Article 5 1. Therefore, customary human rights intervention is not
linked with collective security under Chapter VII. 50
Human rights intervention as an independent doctrine of cus-
tomary international law and as an adjunct to Chapter VII could
perform a function that this chapter does not cover, for instance, in
the case of intra-state massive human rights abuses that do not in-
volve threats to international peace and security. In most cases, how-
ever, it is likely that customary intervention would only take place in
the absence of UN intervention pursuant to Chapter VII. The costs
of the intervention would be borne by the intervening states and
not by the United Nations. As for the nature of the intervention, it
would have to comply with the criteria of the Caroline case.51
When comparing both mechanisms, one cannot fail to notice that
the fact that Chapter VII provides a legal basis for the Security Coun-
cil to intervene does not guarantee that the intervention is legal as
there is a lack of substantive standards as to what constitutes a threat
itself but only recommends action to the General Assembly. See also UN Charter,
supra note 5 at Article i (maintenance of international peace and security);
Article 13 (assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental free-
doms); and Article 14 (measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation).
49 Military Activities in Nicaragua, supra note 31.
50 Note that unilateral human rights intervention has taken place on a few occa-
sions, for instance, India in East Pakistan (197 1), Vietnam in Cambodia (1978),
and Tanzania in Uganda (1979).
51 Caroline case, supra note 30.
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to international peace and security. It is also subject to the veto52
that makes intervention selective and uneven. Financial constraints
may also prevent intervention except in the most shocking cases.
Even if the Security Council were the exclusive authority to approve
armed human rights intervention, it would not be able to manage
the crisis without the economic and military support of a few major
powers, which raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the
whole process. On the other hand, armed intervention pursuant
to a customary international law right of human rights interven-
tion, coexisting with Article 2(4) and (7) of the UN Charter and
not linked with collective security, would not be subject to the veto,
and its legality and justification could be challenged before the
ICJ, which is not the case with respect to Security Council resolu-
tions. Judicial review of the decisions of the Security Council is a
controversial matter. The principle is that the ICJ is not generally
empowered to overrule or undercut decisions made by the Secu-
rity Council under Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter to
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace,
or act of aggression and to decide upon responsive measures to be
taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. In
the 1998 preliminary objections to the Case Concerning Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
Kingdom and Libyan Arab Jamhiriya v. United States of America),53 the
majority of the court side-stepped the judicial review issue. How-
ever, on previous occasions, the court had stated that it does not
possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the deci-
sions taken by the Security Council. 54
By developing an independent doctrine of human rights inter-
vention under customary international law that is not linked to in-
ternational peace and security, international law would recognize
the intrinsic value of human rights and be free of the shackles of
Chapter VII, which must not be the sole legal basis for such type of
52 See the incapacity of the Security Council to act with respect to Kosovo because
of the potential use of the veto by China and the Russian Federation as a result
of which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened.
53 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 19 71 Montreal Con-
vention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan ArabJamahiriya v. United
Kingdom and Libyan ArabJamhiriya v. United States of America) (preliminary objec-
tions), (1998), 37 I.L.M. 587 at paras. 46-50.
54 Advisory Opinion with Respect to Namibia, [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16, at 45.
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intervention irrespective of whether or not collective security mecha-
nisms are functioning effectively. Thus, it would be a progressive
step if the international community were to adopt a doctrine of
customary intervention and restrict Chapter VII to interstate con-
flicts, as it was intended originally, since you cannot extend the
mandate of the Security Council to deal with every human rights
issue as one of international peace and security.
New Developments and Suggestions for the Future
The existence of, or the need for, a customary right of human
rights intervention is not addressed by the International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which concentrated on
the UN Charter and the role of the Security Council in this area of
protection and enforcement of human rights. In its 2001 report
entitled The Responsibility to Protect, the commission dealt with the
question of "when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coer-
cive - and in particular - military action, against another state
for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state."5"
The report is intended to provide precise guidance for states faced
with human rights protection claims in other states. It acknowl-
edges that the primary responsibility rests on each state to protect
its population from harm and that the secondary responsibility rests
on the international community to act where that state is unable or
unwilling to protect its people or is the perpetrator of the harm in
question. The report goes on to state that, "[w] here a population is
suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, re-
pression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields
to the international responsibility to protect."'56
Such responsibility embraces three different expectations:
1. The responsibility to prevent, by addressing both the root causes
and the direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made
crises putting populations at risk. Prevention is the most impor-
tant dimension of the responsibility to protect before any inter-
vention is contemplated.
55 International Development Research Centre, The Responsibility to Protect, Decem-
ber 2001, available at <http:// www.idrc.ca> at foreword [Responsibility to Protect].
56 Ibid. at synopsis (i) Basic Principles B.
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2. The responsibility to react, with appropriate measures that may in-
clude coercive measures such as sanctions, international pros-
ecution, and, in extreme cases, military intervention. Such types
of intervention are only warranted when there is serious and
irreparable harm occurring to human beings or that is immi-
nently likely to occur, such as a large-scale loss of life that may
amount to genocide or a large-scale "ethnic cleansing."
3. The responsibility to rebuild after military intervention.
When military intervention takes place, it must meet several pre-
cautionary principles:
i. Right intention. The purpose of the intervention must be to halt
or avert human suffering, no matter what other motives inter-
vening states may have.
2. Last resort. Military intervention can only be justified when every
non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of
the crisis has been explored.
3. Proportional means. The scale, duration, and intensity of the
planned military intervention (as in the case of self-defence) should
be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protec-
tion objective.
4. Reasonable prospect of success. There must be a reasonable prospect
of success in halting or averting the suffering that has justified
the intervention, with the consequences of the action not likely
to be worse than the consequences of inaction.
With respect to authorization of any military operation, the re-
port states that the United Nations is the only organization with
the universally acceptable authority to validate such operations.57
Within the United Nations, only the Security Council can autho-
rize military intervention for the protection of vulnerable popula-
tions. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as
a source of authority but rather to make the Security Council work
much better than it has in the past. In order to validate any human
rights intervention by a state or coalition of states, the authoriza-
tion of the Security Council must be sought before any military
action is carried out. The Security Council must deal promptly with
any request, and its permanent members must agree not to apply
57 Ibid. at para. 6.12; and UN Charter, supra note 5 at Article 24 (responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security).
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their veto power in matters where their vital interests are not in-
volved. Should the Security Council reject a proposal or fail to deal
with it in a reasonable amount of time, the report suggests that the
matter be referred to the UN General Assembly meeting in an
emergency special session under the Uniting for Peace Resolution 8
or to the relevant regional or sub-regional organization under Chap-
ter VIII of the UN Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent au-
thorization from the Security Council.59
What if these international bodies fail to discharge their respon-
sibilities? It is doubtful and unrealistic to expect that when they fail
to act, a state or a coalition of states, such as the Coalition of the
Willing, will not take unauthorized action and undertake military
operations in conscience-shocking situations that cry for immedi-
ate intervention. The report raises this issue, but it is not clear
whether military action outside the United Nations is legal as a last
resort. It merely recognizes that this possibility should prompt the
Security Council to act in order not to damage the credibility of
the international organization.
60
Although, undoubtedly, the primary responsibility to deal with
human rights crises rests with the United Nations, one should not
rule out unilateral armed action based on a customary right of inter-
vention to meet the gravity and urgency of the situation, provided
the intervening states fully observe the necessary precautionary
principles governing military intervention. It would seem that the
intervention by the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq observed some
of these principles, although the principles of last resort and of
reasonable prospect of success were not fully met.
Unilateral armed intervention could be justified even in the
absence of UN or regional or sub-regional approval in cases of
urgency when the reasons for withholding approval are not weighty
and there is ample evidence that the cause and the motives of
those who would intervene are morally justified. However, who
will determine whether the cause is just and whether the inter-
vener has no other motive than the enforcement of what is right?
This decision could be made by an impartial body, such as the
ICJ, which would make it on an expedited basis. The violation of
human rights must cause irreparable injury, and the intervention
58 Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 48.
59 For example, Liberia in 1992, Sierra Leone in 1997, and NATO in Kosovo in
1999. Note that NATO is not a regional organization.
60 Responsibility to Protect, supra note 55 at para. 6.36.
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must cause less damage to the targeted society than would inac-
tion. The goal is to stop the wrongdoing and protect the victims,
not attack the whole nation. Therefore, the methods used to achieve
these goals must be subject to the principle of proportionality as in
the case of self-defence.
It is suggested that armed human rights intervention by a state or
group of states primarily for the purpose of protecting the nation-
als of the targeted state from widespread deprivation of their inter-
nationally recognized human rights should be possible without the
authorization of the targeted state or the international community
in very urgent situations. Critics maintain, however, that powerful
states are often tempted to use a dubious general customary inter-
national law right to intervene forcibly to fight terrorism or to pro-
tect human rights as an excuse for meddling in the affairs of less
powerful states. Only the United Nations, they say, should be able
to authorize action on behalf of the entire international community
instead of a select few, since such action might not be conducted for
the right reasons or the right commitment to the necessary precau-
tionary principles that are applicable. Unfortunately, unilateral
action is generally motivated by a narrow set of economic or other
interests and ideological goals. It does not provide a degree of pre-
dictability, which is most important in international relations. For
instance, although American security concerns and human rights
abuses were the two official legal and moral justifications for inter-
vening in Iraq for the second time, the real reason for intervening
probably was to secure the supply of oil for the American economy.
In the first Gulf war, the United States wanted to protect the oil re-
sources of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the second Gulf war, it was
Iraqi oil resources that had to be secured. In both instances, the
national interest of the United States dictated its course of action.
In the report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the UN
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change endorsed
"the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsi-
bility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council, authorizing mili-
tary intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other
large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved
powerless or unwilling to prevent.' '61 The panel remarked that the
effectiveness of the global collective security system depends ulti-
mately not only on the legality of the decisions made but also on
61 More Secure World, supra note 34 at para. 203.
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the common perception of their legitimacy.62 Agreed guidelines
should be adopted, which go "directly not to whether force can
legally be used but whether, as a matter of good conscience and good
sense, it should be."63 Thus, in deciding whether to authorize or en-
dorse the use of military force, the Security Council should consider
at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: the seriousness
of the threat; the proper purpose of the military action; last resort;
proportional means; and the balance of consequences. The panel
believed that taking these into account would minimize the possibil-
ity of individual member states by-passing the Security Council.64
WHAT SHOULD BE THE POSITION OF CANADA?
The difficulty with the "war on terror" is that the enemy is invis-
ible and its tentacles reach across national boundaries. Terrorism
does not involve interstate conflicts unless it is state sponsored. Simi-
larly, violations of human rights rarely involve interstate conflicts.
However, the absence of interstate conflicts does not mean that
terrorism and massive violations of human rights do not endanger
the peace and security of mankind. New strategies and tactics are
needed. Is Canada prepared to contribute to their formulation and
implementation? Canada should not restrict itself to the role of
peacemaker or peacekeeper. Canada must collaborate with the
United States and other states in the pursuit of common interests.
It must continue to support the war against terrorism and be pre-
pared to take an active part in the worldwide protection and en-
forcement of human rights. Canada must understand that the
United States is often interested in quick results, whether or not
they can be achieved with UN support. It is to the credit of the
United States that in the Security Council its representatives ar-
gued at length before intervening in Iraq. Cheap knee-jerk anti-
Americanism is not the answer in view of the importance of good
62 Ibid. at para. 204.
63 Ibid. at para. 205.
64 Ibid. at paras. 205-7. See also Scott, supra note 36 at 366-67, who favours the
adoption by the UN General Assembly of a declaration as to when and how
legitimate humanitarian intervention should take place with or without Security
Council backing and the creation of a special committee of the General Assem-
bly meeting in informal sessions to deal with humanitarian crises that are on an
alert list so as to pass judgment should the Security Council fail to act in accor-
dance with the criteria set out in the declaration.
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Canada-United States relations.65 In a unipolar world, it is better to
exercise influence on the United States through a close friendly
relationship than to adopt a confrontational attitude. The interests
of Canada in the world are best served by such a close relationship,
as it is not productive to chart a foreign policy course that conflicts
with the one adopted by Washington. This position does not mean
that Canadian foreign policy must be in step with American for-
eign policy. We can disagree when our views are different but let us
do it in a civilized manner. Our relationship with the United States
must be based on mutual respect, common values, and the pursuit
of common interests.
Canada must promote human security and protect individuals
from violence and repression wherever they are, and it should even
resort to military intervention if absolutely necessary. However, as a
general rule, UN authorization should be sought first since this
body can confer greater legitimacy to intervention than a coalition
of states acting outside of it. When it is not possible, Canada should
be willing to act unilaterally or as part of a coalition of states to
uphold the principle of protection provided precautionary prin-
ciples are followed. Canada must be uncompromising about hu-
man rights on the international stage as it was in Kosovo in 1999 as
part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and as it has been
recently in the Darfur region of Sudan.
Precautionary principles that are relevant to military operations
in the case of human rights intervention are equally relevant when
dealing with international terrorists and those who harbour them.
In both situations, action should always be exercised in a principled
way that, as noted previously, embraces the principles of right in-
tention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects
of success. Before resorting to unilateral armed intervention, non-
coercive measures must be exhausted. Every effort must be made
to develop strategies encouraging peace-building activities. Preven-
tive diplomacy is most important. Incentives to eliminate the con-
ditions that have given rise to the abuses should be offered to the
abusive state. Once intervention has taken place, the perpetrators
of the human rights abuses must be brought to international crimi-
nal justice.
Canada must encourage the international community to adopt
norms that trigger armed intervention and that dictate by whom,
65 See in general J. Welsh, At Home in the World, Canada's Global Vision for the Twenty-
First Century (2004).
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since it would be better to do this in a multilateral convention than
to leave it to customary international law. Violations of human fights
that prompt intervention should be clear and well documented by
the UN Commission on Human Rights on an expedited basis66 or
by a UN-appointed Commission of Inquiry.6 7 This procedure would
avoid any suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the interven-
ing states.
It is to Canada's credit that it has sponsored the creation of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
which produced the report The Responsibility to Protect. The recom-
mendations contained in this report68 are supported by the Cana-
dian government, which is trying to persuade the international
community to adopt them.69 Achieving this goal would probably
require enlarging the mandate of the Security Council by amend-
ing Article 39 of the UN Charter, specifically giving it the power to
authorize intervention in a state with military action or peacekeep-
ers in the case of massive violations of human rights, even when
international peace and security are not endangered. Such an
amendment would be in keeping with the preamble and Article
1 (3) of the UN Charter, which refer to the respect for human rights
as one of the goals of the organization. As already mentioned, the
UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change supports
resort to the Security Council when dealing with the collective in-
ternational responsibility to protect.7'
CONCLUSIONS
What should be done when a state supports terrorism and is will-
ing to supply WMD to terrorist groups or when it violates the fun-
damental human rights of its people and the United Nations is
incapable or unwilling to confront it? Recent intervention in Iraq
66 See, for example, UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1235 (XLII), 6
June 1967.
67 As in the case of the Darfur region of Sudan. See SC Resolution 1564, UN Doc.
S/RES/ 1564 (18 September 2004) at para. 12; and Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary General, 27January 2005, and Report
of the Secretary General 31 January 2005, Doc. S/200 5 / 57.
68 Responsibility to Protect, supra note 55.
69 See Prime Minister Paul Martin at the Francophonie summit in Ouagadougou
in Burkina Faso in November 200 4 .The Canadian government is preparing a
review of Canada's foreign policy to be released in 2005.
70 More Secure World, supra note 34.
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reveals evolving attitudes on the part of some states with respect to
the use of force in anticipatory-preventive self-defence or in pro-
tecting human rights. Yet, post-Cold War interventions do not dem-
onstrate a ready acceptance of a general right of unilateral armed
humanitarian intervention. Although some countries and individu-
als have expressed disapproval of US action in the second Gulf War
as another example of its unilateral interventionist imperialist ap-
proach to world affairs, one must acknowledge that only America
has the power and the resources to defend the international com-
munity against terrorism and to sanction massive violations of hu-
man rights on which there is more or less universal agreement.
The better approach, as suggested by Canada and the UN panel,
is to obtain the authorization of the UN Security Council, pursuant
to an amended Chapter VII or construed broadly beyond the con-
cept of a breach of, or threats to, international peace and security
to cover massive violations of human rights. This authorization
would lend a degree of legitimacy to armed intervention and allow
for sharing the costs and risks. It would also reduce suspicion that
an intervening state may be furthering a self-serving agenda. The
issue is not to by-pass the Security Council but rather to make it
work better. However, as the recent events in the Darfur region of
Sudan and, before that, in Rwanda and other places have demon-
strated, wide support has not been forthcoming. 71 Thus, in certain
extreme circumstances, unilateral armed intervention by a state or
coalition of states without UN approval should be legal and legiti-
mate, provided that the protection of human rights is the domi-
nant motive. The intervention should be driven by altruistic motives
to address the suffering of a foreign people and not primarily to
further the economic gain or geopolitical security interest of the
intervening state.
Today, international law is moving forward by slowly overcoming
the principle of state sovereignty in an attempt to be relevant to a
post-Cold War world when the violation of human rights constitutes
a threat to an orderly international society. Little by little, interna-
tional law is adopting normative moral principles that promote
values of human dignity and justice as well as systemic stability.
71 For instance, so far in the Darfur region of Sudan, the African Union has taken
no military action against the government of Sudan to stop it from participating
in gross violations of human rights. See the sources outlined in note 67 of this
article.
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Neither the lexicon of a just war nor that of terrorism seem to
reflect accurately the current state of world affairs. If terrorists or
massive violators of human rights cannot be brought tojustice peace-
fully, resort to force may be the only effective response to appre-
hend them. However, when directing international efforts to
eradicate terrorism or massive abuses of human rights, the United
States must do so wisely, not as a hegemonic power but as a senior
partner sharing in global power and working out problems through
the United Nations whenever possible.
Above all, it is important that states not become like the terrorists
and violators of human rights and weaken ajust cause by the use of
unjust means. They must work together to deal with the underlying
causes of terrorism and human rights abuses. To eliminate both
requires long-term action. Peace is gained byjustice, not by the force
of arms. Terrorism and human rights abuses can only be effectively
challenged through a concerted multilateral collective approach
and not through the politics of unilateralism. To gain support, al-
lies must be defined more by shared interests than by shared values.
Therefore, it is hoped that in the future, the United States will move
towards global leadership rather than global domination and will
fully support action by the United Nations, as it has done lately in
the case of humanitarian assistance arising from the 26 December
2004 tsunami.72 By acting in this way, the United States will restore
its credibility as an international presence for stability and security
and give an ethical dimension to its imperial tendencies.
As US president Harry Truman declared when the United Na-
tion was founded: "We have to recognize - no matter how great
our strength - that we must deny ourselves the license to do al-
ways as we please."73 This notion is more relevant now than ever
before, as the United States remains the sole superpower in the
world. Even though the unilateral military intervention in Iraq by
the Coalition of the Willing, without the authorization of the
United Nations, appears to be neither legal nor legitimate, it has
had a positive effect by bringing to the fore the need to widen the
mandate of the Security Council rather than letting it evolve by
re-interpretation. As acknowledged by the UN high-level panel, a
72 See Z. Brzezinski, The Choice, Global Domination or Global Leadership (2004). With
respect to unilateralism versus multilateralism, see R. Kagan, Of Paradise and
Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (vintage ed., 2003-4) at 144.
73 Quoted in More Secure World, supra note 34 at Part 4: "A More Effective United
Nations for the Twenty-First Century" and synopsis at 64.
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new international customary norm is emerging, which recognizes
that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, ex-
ercisable by the Security Council to authorize military action as a
last resort in the event of massive violations of human rights. Thus,
international law is evolving in the right direction. Let us hope that
this new emerging norm will soon become widely accepted and,
when necessary, will be acted upon by all of the members of the
United Nations.
Sommaire
L'intervention arm~e unilat~rale face au terrorisme, au neo-
imp~rialisme et aux violations massives des droits de l'homme: le
droit international 6volue-t-il dans la bonne direction?
L'intervention militaire unilatrale en Iraq par les Etats-Unis et ses allies
sans l'approbation du Conseil de S&uriti qui repose sur la ligitime defense
prdventive contre la menace d 'actes de terrorisme et sur la responsabilitg de
protiger la population iraquienne contre la violation massive des droits de
l'homme par Saddam Hussein pose la question de savoir si cette interven-
tion est compatible avec les donnies actuelles du droit international. Les
principes de non intervention et de non ingrence noncis aux paragraphes
4 et 7 de l'artice 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies et qui ont leur source
dans la r~gle de lIgaliti souveraine des Etats conservent-t-ils encore toute
leur force? Dans ltat actuel du droit international, il est clair que
lintervention amtricaine en Iraq n 'est ni ligale ni lgitime. Seul le Conseil
de Sicuriti avait le droit d'autoriser une telle intervention en vertu du
Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies a' mons que 1Intervenant
invoque le droit de lgitime defense reconnu par l'article 51 de cette Charte
ou par le droit international coutumier strictement interpriti. Quant au
droit d ingrence, le droit international coutumier tvolue dans la bonne
direction puisqu' il commence h reconnaitre l'existence d'une responsabilit
internationale de protection des personnes qui sont les victimes de viola-
tions massives des droits de rhomme. En effet, les droits de I'homme font
naitre d ligard de l'Etat des obligations internationales qui conditionnent
l'exercice de sa compitence territoriale. Il s agit d'une consiquence directe
de la singulariti substantielle des droit de l'homme et de leur caractre objectif.
Cependant, ici encore, I' intervention am&icaine devait itre approuvie par
le Conseil de Sicuriti car seule I'organisation des Nations Unies a le droit
de sanctionner les atteintes aux libertsfondamentales perpitrdes ti lintrieur
mime d'un Etat.
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Summary
The Legality and Legitimacy of Unilateral Armed Intervention in
an Age of Terror, Neo-Imperialism, and Massive Violations of Hu-
man Rights: Is International Law Evolving in the Right Direction?
With the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the sole
remaining superpower whose ambition is to create a new open and inte-
grated world order based on principles of democratic capitalism. To ensure
its hegemony, the United States is prepared to resort to military action with
or without UN approval when its international and national security inter-
ests are at stake. The intervention in Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing is
a good example of this policy and raises the question of its legality and
legitimacy under contemporary international law. May or must a state re-
sort to military intervention against a state sponsoring terrorism or depriv-
ing its nationals of their internationally recognized human rights? The
so-called "Bush doctrine" of anticipatory or preventive self-defence against a
state accused of supplying weapons of mass destruction to a foreign terrorist
organization, which was one of the reasons advanced by the Coalition of the
Willing for intervening in Iraq, meets neither the conditions laid out in
Article 5 r of the UN Charter nor those of customary international law.
Thus, at the present stage of development of international law, the Bush
doctrine is not even lege ferenda. It is not an extension of the customary
international law right of pre-emptive self-defence. Only with the approval
of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter or when
it takes place within the strict confines of self-defence, can armed interven-
tion be legitimate.
The second reason for intervening in Iraq given by the Coalition of the
Willing is based on humanitarian considerations, which raises the question
whether the protection of human rights can be assured from the outside.
Here, international law is evolving in the right direction since the interna-
tional community is prepared to adopt the concept of responsibility to pro-
tect, which justifies the use offorce to protect and enforce human rights as
an exception to Article 2(4) and (7) of the UN Charter Again, such inter-
vention is legal only when approved by the Security Council acting pursu-
ant to Chapter VII on the ground that human right crises do not fall
"essentially within the jurisdiction of any state. " However, the international
community, with the exception of the Coalition of the Willing, is not yet
prepared to support a right of unilateral military intervention as a last
resort when the Security Council is incapable and unwilling to do so. This
includes intervention motivated by the non-democratic form of govern-
ment of the targeted state. Although the primary responsibility to deal with
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human right crises rests with the United Nations based on the responsibility
to protect, it is argued that one should not rule out unilateral military ac-
tion based on a customary international law right of intervention to meet
the gravity and urgency of the situation provided the intervening state fully
observes the necessary precautionary principles governing such type of inter-
vention. The conclusion is that terrorism and human rights abuses can
only be effectively challenged through a concerted multilateral collective ap-
proach not through the politics of unilateralism.
